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Abstract—Items shared through Social Media may affect more than one user’s privacy — e.g., photos that depict multiple users,
comments that mention multiple users, events in which multiple users are invited, etc. The lack of multi-party privacy management
support in current mainstream Social Media infrastructures makes users unable to appropriately control to whom these items are
actually shared or not. Computational mechanisms that are able to merge the privacy preferences of multiple users into a single policy
for an item can help solve this problem. However, merging multiple users’ privacy preferences is not an easy task, because privacy
preferences may conflict, so methods to resolve conflicts are needed. Moreover, these methods need to consider how users’ would
actually reach an agreement about a solution to the conflict in order to propose solutions that can be acceptable by all of the users
affected by the item to be shared. Current approaches are either too demanding or only consider fixed ways of aggregating privacy
preferences. In this paper, we propose the first computational mechanism to resolve conflicts for multi-party privacy management in
Social Media that is able to adapt to different situations by modelling the concessions that users make to reach a solution to the
conflicts. We also present results of a user study in which our proposed mechanism outperformed other existing approaches in terms
of how many times each approach matched users’ behaviour.
Index Terms—Social Media, Privacy, Conflicts, Multi-party Privacy, Social Networking Services, Online Social Networks
F
1 INTRODUCTION
HUNDREDS of billions of items that are uploaded toSocial Media are co-owned by multiple users [1],
yet only the user that uploads the item is allowed to
set its privacy settings (i.e., who can access the item).
This is a massive and serious problem as users’ pri-
vacy preferences for co-owned items usually conflict, so
applying the preferences of only one party risks such
items being shared with undesired recipients, which
can lead to privacy violations with severe consequences
(e.g., users losing their jobs, being cyberstalked, etc.) [2].
Examples of items include photos that depict multiple
people, comments that mention multiple users, events
in which multiple users are invited, etc. Multi-party
privacy management is, therefore, of crucial importance
for users to appropriately preserve their privacy in Social
Media. A solution for this could be to merge individual
privacy preferences into a joint sharing policy for the
item. This joint policy would be valid as long as individ-
ual preferences do not conflict. However, there are many
situations in which privacy preferences may conflict.
For instance, imagine that Alice and Bob are depicted
together in a photo in which Bob appears drunk, and
that Alice would like to share the photo with her friend
Charlie, but Bob would not like to share the photo with
Charlie because Bob feels embarrassed about his looks
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in the photo and Charlie is just a distant acquaintance
of him.
There is recent evidence that users very often negoti-
ate collaboratively to achieve an agreement on privacy
settings for co-owned information in Social Media [3],
[4]. In particular, users are known to be generally open
to accommodate other users’ preferences, and they are
willing to make some concessions to reach an agree-
ment depending on the specific situation [4]. However,
current Social Media privacy controls solve this kind of
situations by only applying the sharing preferences of
the party that uploads the item, so users are forced to
negotiate manually using other means such as e-mail,
SMSs, phone calls, etc. [5] — e.g., Alice and Bob may
exchange some e-mails to discuss whether or not they
actually share their photo with Charlie. The problem
with this is that negotiating manually all the conflicts
that appear in the everyday life may be time-consuming
because of the high number of possible shared items and
the high number of possible accessors (or targets) to be
considered by users [2]; e.g., a single average user in
Facebook has more than 140 friends and uploads more
than 22 photos [6].
Computational mechanisms that can automate the
negotiation process have been identified as one of the
biggest gaps in privacy management in social media [3],
[4], [5], [7], [8]. Note that the aim of these mechanisms
would not be that users lose control by providing a
fully automated solution, as this has been proven not
to achieve satisfactory results when it comes to privacy
management in social media [9]. Instead, these mecha-
nisms would suggest a possible solution to the conflicts
that users would need to accept to be finally applied — if
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2users do not accept the suggestion they will need to enter
into a manual negotiation by other means. Therefore,
the main challenge is to propose solutions that can be
accepted most of the time by all the users involved in
an item (e.g., all users depicted in a photo), so that users
are forced to negotiate manually as little as possible, thus
minimising the burden on the user to resolve multi-party
privacy conflicts.
Very recent related literature proposed mechanisms to
resolve multi-party privacy conflicts in social media [2],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Some of them [10], [11] need too
much human intervention during the conflict resolution
process, by requiring users to solve the conflicts manually
or close to manually; e.g., participating in difficult-to-
comprehend auctions for each and every co-owned item.
Other approaches to resolve multi-party privacy conflicts
are more automated [2], [12], [13], but they only consider
one fixed way of aggregating user’s privacy preferences
(e.g., veto voting [2]) without considering how users
would actually achieve compromise and the concessions
they might be willing to make to achieve it depending
on the specific situation. Only [14] considers more than
one way of aggregating users’ privacy preferences, but
the user that uploads the item chooses the aggregation
method to be applied, which becomes a unilateral deci-
sion without considering the preferences of the others.
All of this makes the above mechanisms unable to
adapt to different situations that may motivate different
users’ concessions, suggesting solutions that may not be
acceptable by all users, so that users may need to end
up negotiating manually most of the time.
In this paper, we present the first computational mech-
anism for social media that, given the individual privacy
preferences of each user involved in an item, is able to
find and resolve conflicts by applying a different conflict
resolution method based on the concessions users’ may
be willing to make in different situations. We also present
a user study comparing our computational mechanism
of conflict resolution and other previous approaches to
what users would do themselves manually in a number
of situations. The results obtained suggest our proposed
mechanism significantly outperformed other previously
proposed approaches in terms of the number of times it
matched participants’ behaviour in the study.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 provides some background on individual pri-
vacy preferences and the problem statement. Section 3
provides an overview of our proposed computational
mechanism for multi-party privacy conflicts resolution.
Section 4 describes the mechanism to detect multi-
party privacy conflicts by analysing users’ individual
privacy preferences. Section 5 presents the method to
estimate concessions and, based on this, suggest solu-
tions to multi-party privacy conflicts. Section 6 details
the method, participants and results of the user study
we conducted to compare our proposal with other state-
of-the-art approaches. Section 7 discusses related work.
Finally, Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
2 BACKGROUND
Assume a finite set of users U , where a finite subset of
negotiating users N ⊆ U , negotiate whether they should
grant a finite subset of target users1 T ⊆ U access to a
particular co-owned item. For instance, Alice and Bob
(negotiating users) negotiate about whether they should
grant Charlie (target user) access to a photo of them
depicted together. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we will consider a negotiation for one item
over the course of this paper — e.g., a photo that depicts
the negotiating users together — and hence, we do not
include any additional notation for the item in question.
2.1 Individual Privacy Preferences
Negotiating users have their own individual privacy
preferences about the item — i.e., to whom of their
online friends they would like to share the item if they
were to decide it unilaterally. In this paper, we assume
negotiating users specify their individual privacy prefer-
ences using group-based access control, which is nowa-
days mainstream in Social Media (e.g., Facebook lists or
Google+ circles), to highlight the practical applicability
of our proposed approach. Note, however, that other
access control approaches for Social Media could also be
used in conjunction with our proposed mechanism —
such as relationship-based access control [15], [16], [17],
or (semi-)automated approaches like [18], [19], [20]. To
illustrate this, Appendix A describes how relationship-
based access control could be used in conjunction with
our mechanism. Note also that our approach does not
necessarily need users to specify their individual privacy
preferences for each and every item separately, they
could also specify the same preferences for collections
or categories of items for convenience according to the
access control model being used —e.g., Facebook users
can specify the same preferences for all the photos in a
photo album.
Mainstream Social Media (Facebook, Google+, etc.)
have predefined groups and also allow users to define
their own groups, each of which is composed of a
set of friends. Access to items (photos, etc.) can be
granted/denied to groups, individuals or both (e.g.,
all Friends have access to a photo except Charlie). We
formally define a group G ⊆ U as a set of users,
and the set of all groups defined by a particular user
u as Gu = {G1, . . . , Gl}, so that
⋂
G∈Gu G = ∅. For
instance, Alice may have defined the following groups
GAlice = {CloseFriends,Family,Coworkers}2 to or-
ganise her online friends.
1. Note that we defined the set of target users as a subset of the
users; i.e., without forcing it to satisfy a particular property, to remain
as general as possible. However, the set of target users could be further
qualified as a particular subset of users satisfying any property without
changing the subsequent formalisation; e.g., the set of target users
could be defined as the union of all of the negotiating users’ online
friends.
2. For simplicity, we represent groups using a meaningful label
3Definition 1: A privacy policy P is a tuple P = 〈A,E〉,
where A is the set of groups granted access and E ⊆ U
is a set of individual user exceptions.
According to most Social Media infrastructures, the
semantics of a group-based privacy policy are as follows:
P.A are the groups that are authorised (or granted) access
to the item; i.e., all users belonging to these groups
are granted access to the item; and P.E are a set of
individual exceptions; i.e., either users in the authorised
groups who are denied access individually, or users
who are granted access individually because they are
in the unauthorised groups —which are the groups not
explicitly granted access. Continuing the example above,
Alice now defines her individual privacy policy for an
item as PAlice = 〈{CloseFriends}, {Charlie}〉, which
means that Alice wants to share the item only with
CloseFriends but excluding Charlie.
2.2 Problem Statement
The problem we deal with is the following: how the set
of negotiating users N = {n1, . . . , nk} who co-own an item
but that have different individual (and possibly conflicting)
privacy policies Pn1 , . . . , Pnk for that item can agree on to
whom, from the set of the target users T = {t1, . . . , tm},
the item should be shared with? This problem can be
decomposed into:
1) Given the set of individual privacy policies
Pn1 , . . . , Pnk of each negotiating user for the item,
how can we identify if at least two policies have
contradictory decisions — or conflicts — about
whether or not granting target users T access to
the item3.
2) If conflicts are detected, how can we propose a
solution to the conflicts found that respects as
much as possible the preferences of negotiating
users N .
3 MECHANISM OVERVIEW
We propose the use of a mediator that detects conflicts
and suggests a possible solution to them. For instance,
in most Social Media infrastructures, such as Facebook,
Twitter, Google+ and the like, this mediator could be
integrated as the back-end of Social Media privacy con-
trols’ interface; or it could be implemented as a Social
Media application — such as a Facebook app — that
works as an interface to the privacy controls of the
underlying Social Media infrastructure. In a nutshell, the
process the mediator follows is:
1) The mediator inspects the individual privacy poli-
cies of all users for the item and flags all the
3. We focus on detecting conflicts once we know all the parties that
co-own an item and have their individual privacy policies for the item.
We are not proposing a method to automatically detect which items are
co-owned and by whom they are co-owned. This is a different problem
that is out of the scope of this paper. Refer to [21] as an example of a
method to detect the people that is depicted in a photo with very high
accuracy for Social Media.
conflicts found (as described in Section 4). Basically,
it looks at whether individual privacy policies sug-
gest contradictory access control decisions for the
same target user.
2) The mediator proposes a solution for each conflict
found. To this aim, the mediator estimates (as
described in Section 5) how willing each negoti-
ating user may be to concede by considering: her
individual privacy preferences, how sensitive the
particular item is for her, and the relative impor-
tance of the conflicting target users for her.
If all users accept the solution proposed, it will be
applied. Otherwise, users will need to turn into a manual
negotiation by other means.
4 CONFLICT DETECTION
We need a way to compare the individual privacy pref-
erences of each negotiating user in order to detect con-
flicts among them. However, each user is likely to have
defined different groups of users, so privacy policies
from different users may not be directly comparable.
To compare privacy policies from different negotiating
users for the same item, we consider the effects that
each particular privacy policy has on the set of target
users T . Privacy policies dictate a particular action to
be performed when a user in T tries to access the item.
In particular, we assume that the available actions are
either 0 (denying access) or 1 (granting access). The
action to perform according to a given privacy policy
is determined as follows4:
Definition 2: Given an user n ∈ N , her groups Gn, her
individual privacy policy Pn = 〈A,E〉, and a user t ∈ T ;
we define the action function as:
act(Pn, t) =

1 if ∃G ∈ Gn : t ∈ G ∧G ∈ Pn.A ∧ t /∈ Pn.E
1 if ∃G ∈ Gn : t ∈ G ∧G /∈ Pn.A ∧ t ∈ Pn.E
0 otherwise
We also consider so-called action vectors ~v ∈ {0, 1}|T |;
i.e., complete assignments of actions to all users in T ,
such that v[t] denotes the action for user t ∈ T . When a
privacy policy is applied to the set of users T , it produces
such an action vector:
Definition 3: The action vector produced by privacy
policy P when applied to T is ~v = (v1, . . . , v|T |), where
v[t] = act(P, t).
Given the action vectors produced by the privacy
policies of all negotiating users, we are now in a position
to be able to detect whether there are any conflicting
actions suggested for the same target user. That is, if all
the action vectors assign the same action for all target
users, then there is no conflict. Otherwise, there are at
4. Note that the definition of this function will vary according to the
access control model used, but it will be defined in a similar way. That
is, the idea is to be able to know, given a target user t, whether the
privacy policy will grant/deny t access to the item regardless of the
access control model being used. For instance, Appendix A describes
this function for relationship-based access control.
4least two action vectors that assign different actions to
the same target user, and there is a conflict. In other
words, a conflict arises when some negotiating users
would like to grant access to one target user while the
others would not. Formally:
Definition 4 (conflict): Given a set of negotiating users
N and a set of target users T ; a target user t ∈ T is
said to be in conflict iff ∃a, b ∈ N with individual privacy
policies Pa and Pb respectively, so that va[t] 6= vb[t].
Further, we say that the set of users in conflict C ⊆ T ,
is the set that contains all the target users that are in
conflict.
Algorithm 1 Conflict Detection
Input: N , Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , T
Output: C
1: for all n ∈ N do
2: ~vn ← Apply Pn to T
3: end for
4: C ← ∅
5: for all t ∈ T do
6: if ∃a, b ∈ N, va[t] 6= vb[t] then
7: C ← C ∪ {t}
8: end if
9: end for
The mediator runs Algorithm 1 to detect conflicts by
harvesting the users in conflict set C. The complexity of
the algorithm is polynomial and it depends on the num-
ber of negotiating users and target users O(|N |2 × |T |).
If Algorithm 1 does not detect any conflict — i.e., C = ∅,
it will return to the users without changes to their
preferred privacy policies. If Algorithm 1 detects con-
flicts, the mediator will then run the conflict resolution
module, which is described in the following section.
Example 1: Assume a set of users U = {Alice,Bob,
Charlie,Dan,Eve,Frank}. Negotiating users N =
{Alice,Bob} are in the process of deciding to which
target users T = {Charlie,Dan,Eve,Frank} they
grant access to a photo in which both of them
are depicted. Negotiating users defined the follow-
ing groups: Alice defined GAlice = {MyFriends} so
that MyFriends = {Charlie,Dan,Eve}; and Bob
defined GBob = {CloseFriends,Family} so that
CloseFriends = {Charlie,Eve} and Family =
{Dan,Frank}. Now, assume that negotiating users have
the following individual privacy policies for the photo:
Alice has PAlice = 〈{MyFriends}, {Eve}〉 so that
~vAlice = (1, 1, 0, 0) — i.e., only Charlie and Dan would
be granted access to the photo; and Bob has PBob =
〈{CloseFriends,Family}, ∅〉 so that ~vBob = (1, 1, 1, 1)
— i.e., all target users Charlie, Dan, Eve and Frank
would be granted access to the photo. As vAlice[Eve] 6=
vBob[Eve] and vAlice[Frank] 6= vBob[Frank], the set of
users in conflict is C = {Eve,Frank}.
5 CONFLICT RESOLUTION
After conflicts are detected, the mediator suggests the
best possible solution according to negotiators’ pref-
erences. To this aim, the mediator models negotiation
behaviour; i.e., to what extent negotiating users might be
willing to concede in favour of the actions proposed by
others. We shall firstly explain the method by which the
mediator estimates the willingness of each user to accept
changing their preferred action for each conflict detected.
Secondly, we shall explain how the mediator estimates
whether each negotiating user would actually concede
or not for a given conflict based on her willingness
to change her preferred action for the conflict and on
the implications for the other negotiating users — i.e.,
how beneficial/detrimental this change would be for
her and the others. Finally, we shall describe how the
mediator computes a solution to the conflicts based on
the concessions users would do.
5.1 Estimating the Willingness to change an action
In order to find a solution to the conflict that can
be acceptable by all negotiating users, it is key to ac-
count for how important is for each negotiating user
to grant/deny access to the conflicting target user. In
particular, the mediator estimates how willing a user
would be to change the action (granting/denying) she
prefers for a target agent in order to solve the conflict
based on two main factors: the sensitivity of the item and
the relative importance of the conflicting target user.
5.1.1 Estimating Item Sensitivity
If a user feels that an item is very sensitive for her5, she
will be less willing to accept sharing it than if the item
is not sensitive for her [22], [23]. One way of eliciting
item sensitivity would be to ask the user directly, but
this would increase the burden on the user. Instead, the
mediator estimates how sensitive an item is for a user
based on how strict is her individual privacy policy for
the item [19], so that the stricter the privacy policy for
the item the more sensitive it will be. Intuitively, the
lower the number of friends granted access, the stricter
the privacy policy, hence, the more sensitive the item is.
Moreover, not all friends are the same; i.e., users may feel
closer to some friends than others and friends may be
in different groups representing different social contexts.
Thus, both the group and the strength of each relation-
ship are considered when estimating the strictness of
privacy policies and, therefore, the sensitivity of items.
The mediator can use any of the existing tools to
automatically obtain relationship strength (or tie strength)
values for all the user’s friends for particular Social
Media infrastructures such as Facebook [24], [25] and
Twitter [26] with minimal user intervention. Even if the
mediator would not be able to use these tools, users
5. Note that we particularly stress that an item is sensitive for
someone. This is because the same item may be seen as having different
sensitivity by different people.
5could be asked to self-report their tie strength to their
friends, which would obviously mean more burden on
the users but would still be possible. Whatever the pro-
cedure being used, the mediator just assumes that the tie
strength value assigned for each pair of friends a and b is
given by a function τ(a, b), so that τ : U×U → {0, . . . , δ},
where δ is the maximum positive integer value in the tie
strength scale used6.
Based on these values, the mediator considers how
strict is a user’s individual privacy policy as an estimate
of the sensitivity of an item by calculating the minimum
tie strength needed in each group to have access to the
item and averaging it across groups. That is, if a privacy
policy only grants users with close relationships (i.e.,
friends with high tie strength values) access to an item,
then the item will be estimated as sensitive, since the
privacy policy is very strict (i.e., the average minimum
tie strength across groups to have access to the item is
very high). On the contrary, if a privacy policy grants
users with low tie strengths across groups, then the
item will be estimated as less sensitive, since the privacy
policy is less strict.
Definition 5: Given a user n ∈ N , her groups Gn,
and her individual privacy policy Pn for an item, the
sensitivity of the item for n is estimated as:
Sn = 1| Gn |
∑
G∈Gn
Tn(G)
where Tn(G) is the strictness of the privacy policy in
group G, defined as the minimum tie strength needed
in group G to have access to the item:
Tn(G) = min
t∈G
f(n, t)
and f(n, t) is based on the tie strength between users
n and t. However, this function considers differently
situations where t is given access and situations where t
is denied access. In particular, if user t is granted access,
then function f returns the tie strength between users n
and t. On the contrary, if user t is denied access, then
this user must not be considered when determining the
policy strictness for the group and function f returns the
maximum tie strength value (recall that Tn(G) is defined
as the minimum value returned by function f for all
users in a group). More formally, f(n, t) is defined as
follows:
f(n, t) =
{
τ(n, t) iff act(Pn, t) = 1
δ iff act(Pn, t) = 0
5.1.2 Estimating the relative importance of the con-
flict
Now the focus is on the particular conflicting target user
— i.e., the target user for which different negotiating
6. The maximum tie strength value δ depends on the tool used. For
example, in Fogue´s et al. [24] δ = 5; i.e., six levels of tie strength, which
would map to, for instance, the friend relationship as: 0-no relationship,
1-acquaintance, 2-distant friend, 3-friend, 4-close friend, 5-best friend.
users would prefer a different action (denying/granting
access to the item). The mediator estimates how impor-
tant a conflicting target user is for a negotiating user
by considering both tie strength with the conflicting
target user and the group the conflicting target user
belongs to, which are known to play a crucial role when
deciding who can see which items — refer to [27], [28],
[29] and [18], [20], [30] respectively. For instance, Alice
may decide she does not want to share a party photo
(in which she appears with her class mates) with her
mother, who has a very close relationship to Alice (i.e.,
tie strength between Alice and her mother is high). If
some of her class mates want to make the party photo
public to anyone (which entails that Alice’s mother will
be able to see the photo), it is plausible to believe that
Alice would be really unwilling to share the party photo
with her mother (i.e., not sharing the photo with her
mother is very important to Alice). Another example
would be a photo in which Alice is depicted together
with some friends with a view to a monument, and
Alice wants to share it with all her friends. If some of
her friends that appear in the monument photo want
to share it with Alice’s acquaintances, it is plausible to
believe that Alice may be willing to share the monu-
ment photo with acquaintances too as she is willing
to share it with all her friends (not sharing the photo
with acquaintances may not be very important to Alice).
Thus, the mediator estimates the relative importance
of a particular conflicting user considering both the tie
strength with this user in general and within the par-
ticular group she belongs to. In particular, the mediator
estimates the relative importance a conflicting target user
has for a negotiating user as the difference between the
tie strength with the conflicting user and the strictness
of the policy for the group the conflicting user belongs
to. If the conflicting target user does not belong to any
group of the negotiator; then the relative importance
is estimated considering the item sensitivity instead as
there is no group information.
Definition 6: Given a user n ∈ N , her groups Gn, and
a conflicting user c ∈ C, the relative importance of c for
n is estimated as follows:
In(c) =
{
| Tn(G)− τ(n, c) | if ∃G ∈ Gn : c ∈ G
| Sn − τ(n, c) | otherwise
For instance, assume Alice would like to share
with all her friends —i.e., TAlice(Friends) = 1— but
not with Charlie, who is close friend of her —i.e.,
τ(Alice, Charlie) = 5. The relative importance would be
calculated as IAlice(Charlie) =| 1− 5 |= 4, which means
that the action Alice prefers for Charlie is quite important
to her; e.g., Alice could be creating an event in which she
invites all her friends except Charlie because the event is
a surprise for Charlie’s birthday, so sharing with Charlie
would mean ruining the surprise party. In the very same
way, if Alice would like to share an item only with her
best friend —i.e., TAlice(Friends) = 5, the relative im-
6portance of denying access to an acquaintance would be
high too —i.e., if Peter is an acquaintance of Alice such
that τ(Alice, Peter) = 1, then IAlice(Peter) =| 5− 1 |= 4.
5.1.3 Estimating Willingness
Finally, the mediator estimates the willingness to change
the preferred action (granting/denying) for a conflicting
target user accounting for both the sensitivity of the item
and the relative importance of the conflicting target user
as detailed above. If both sensitivity and relative impor-
tance are the highest possible, then the willingness to
change should be minimal. On the contrary, if both sen-
sitivity and relative importance are the lowest possible,
then the willingness to change should be maximal. Thus,
we define willingness as a distance (in a 2-dimensional
space) between the values of both item sensitivity and
relative importance and the maximum possible values
for both — as shown above, both measures are defined
in tie strength units and have δ as their maximum value7.
We chose for this the Canberra distance8 instead of
other distances like Euclidean, Manhattan, or Chebyshev
because it is a relative and not absolute distance metric
— so that it would work in the same way regardless of
the δ value being used.
Definition 7: Given user n ∈ N , her preferred privacy
policy Pn, the maximum tie strength value δ, a conflict-
ing target user c ∈ C, the willingness of user n to accept
changing her most preferred action for c is a function
W : N × C → [0, 1] so that:
W(n, c) = 1
2
·
( | δ − In(c) |
δ + In(c)
+
| δ − Sn |
δ + Sn
)
Note that the only difference from a 2-dimensional
Canberra distance is that we divide by 2 the final result
to normalise the willingness into a real value within the
[0,1] interval for convenience to model concessions as
shown in the following section (Section 5.2).
Example 2: Suppose Example 1 and that we would like
to obtain the willingness of Alice and Bob to accept
changing their preferred actions for the conflicts found
C = {Eve, Frank}. Suppose also that the tie strength be-
tween users are those given in Table 1. Table 2 shows all
the willingness values for each of the conflicts and pos-
sible solutions. For instance, to calculate W(Alice,Eve),
the mediator first calculates the item sensitivity and the
relative importance of Eve as follows:
SAlice = 1| GAlice |
∑
G∈GAlice
TAlice(G) = TAlice(MyFriends) = 2
7. Note, however, that the calculations and meaning for sensitivity
and relative importance are different and they may have different
values for the same conflict, so this is why they are considered as
two different dimensions for the willingness.
8. Given two n-dimensional vectors ~p and ~q, the Canberra distance
[31] is defined as:
d(~p, ~q) =
n∑
i=1
| pi − qi |
| pi | + | qi |
and
IAlice(Eve) =| TAlice(MyFriends)− τ(Alice,Eve) |=| 2− 1 |= 1
Then, the mediator estimates the willingness as fol-
lows:
W(Alice,Eve) = 1
2
·
( | δ − IAlice(Eve) |
δ + IAlice(Eve)
+
| δ − SAlice |
δ + SAlice
)
=
1
2
·
( | 5− 1 |
5 + 1
+
| 5− 2 |
5 + 2
)
=
1
2
·
(
4
6
+
3
7
)
≈ 0.55
We can see in Table 2 that the mediator would estimate
Alice’s willingness to grant Eve access to the item higher
than Alice’s willingness to grant Frank access to the item
— recall Alice’s preferred action for both Eve and Frank
is to deny access, so the mediator estimates willingness
to grant access. The reason for the estimated willingness
is that, though the item seems not very sensitive for
Alice (Sa = 2), Eve is closer to Alice than Frank, who
seems not to be friend of Alice at all or be a very
distant acquaintance because of a 0 tie strength. We can
also see in Table 2 that the mediator would estimate
Bob’s willingness not to share with Eve to be lower
than Bob’s willingness not to share with Frank — recall
Bob’s preferred action for both Eve and Frank is to
grant access, so the mediator estimates willingness to deny
access. This is because Eve seems to have higher relative
importance than Frank for Bob; i.e., Eve seems to be best
friends with Bob (high tie strength), so it is plausible to
believe Bob would definitely want to share with his best
friend and would be unwilling to accept not sharing with
her.
Charlie Dan Eve Frank
Alice 4 2 1 0
Bob 3 2 5 2
TABLE 1
Tie strength for Example 2, with δ = 5 according to [24].
Eve Frank
Alice 0.55 0.43
Bob 0.34 0.71
TABLE 2
Willingness for Example 2.
5.2 Modelling Concessions
As suggested by existing research [3], [4], [5], negoti-
ations about privacy in social media are collaborative
most of the time. That is, users would consider others’
preferences when deciding to whom they share, so users
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may be willing to concede and change their initial most-
preferred option. Being able to model the situations in
which these concessions happen is of crucial importance
to propose the best solution to the conflicts found —
one that would be acceptable by all the users involved.
To this aim, the mediator models users’ decision-making
processes during negotiations based on the willingness
to change an action (defined above) as well as on find-
ings about manual negotiations in this domain, like the
ones described in [3], [4], [5]. Users’ decision making
on continuous variables, like the willingness to accept
an action, is commonly modelled using fuzzy sets that
characterize intervals of the continuous variables [32].
Figure 1 depicts the intervals the mediator considers for
the willingness to accept an action. This means that the
mediator can consider the willingness to accept an action
for a conflicting target user to be low or high. Based
on this, the mediator considers fuzzy IF-THEN rules
to model concessions in different situations as described
below.
I do not mind (IDM) rule
Users are generally willing to accommodate others’ shar-
ing preferences [3], [4], so if they do not mind much
about which action is finally applied, they will concede
and accept applying the action that is not the most
preferred for them. In particular, if the willingness to
accept the action that is not the preferred one is high,
then this may mean that the user would not mind much
conceding and accepting that action for the conflicting
target user. Assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N , and
a conflicting target user c ∈ C, this concession can be
formalised as the following fuzzy IF-THEN rule:
IF W(a, c) IS high THEN concede (IDM)
Note that concede means that user a would accept
changing her initial most preferred action to reach an
agreement. Thus, users that would initially prefer grant-
ing the particular conflicting target user access to the
corresponding item would accept denying access, and
users that would initially prefer denying the particular
conflicting target user access to the corresponding item
would accept granting access. For instance, Alice and
Bob could be depicted in a photo with very low sensi-
tivity — e.g., a photo in which both Alice and Bob are
depicted with a view to a monument — and both of
them could have defined privacy policies for the photo
so that all their friends can see it. Suppose that Charlie
is friend of Alice but is distant acquaintance of Bob,
so according to Alice’s privacy policy Charlie should
be granted access to the photo but according to Bob’s
privacy policy Charlie should not be granted access to
the photo. However, given that the photo is not sensitive
for Bob, Bob would probably accept sharing also with
Charlie and solve the conflict.
I understand (IU) rule
Even when the willingness to change an action is low for
some of the negotiating users, users do not want to cause
any deliberate harm to their friends and will normally
listen to their objections [4]. That is, if some of the
negotiating users prefer denying a conflicting target user
access and the willingness to grant access is low, then
other users whose most preferred action for the target
user is granting access and the willingness to accept
denying is also low would concede and accept denying
access to the conflicting target user. Indeed, considering
others self-presentation online has been reported as a
way of reaffirming and reciprocating user’s relationships
[4], [27]. Assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N , and a
conflicting target user c ∈ C, this concession can be
formalised as the following fuzzy IF-THEN rule:
IF W(a, c) IS low ∧ va[c] = 1 ∧
∃b ∈ N, W(b, c) IS low ∧ vb[c] = 0
THEN concede (IU)
For instance, Alice, Bob, and Charlie are depicted
together in a photo in which Bob is clearly inebriated.
Initially, Alice and Charlie might very much like to
share the photo with friends because Alice, Bob and
Charlie could agree they had a very good time together
that day in which the photo was taken. However, Alice
and Charlie would probably understand the privacy
implications this may entail to Bob. Thus, if Bob opposes
sharing the photo, Alice and Charlie would probably
accept not sharing the photo.
No concession (NC) rule
For the other cases in which neither IDM nor IU ap-
plies, then the mediator estimates that a negotiating
user would not concede and would prefer to stick to
her preferred action for the conflicting target user. For
completeness, this can be formalised as the following
fuzzy IF-THEN rule assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N ,
and a conflicting target user c ∈ C:
8IF W(a, c) IS low ∧
(va[c] = 0 ∨ (6 ∃b ∈ N :W(b, c) IS low ∧ vb[c] = 0))
THEN do not concede (NC)
For instance, when the willingness to accept granting
grating access to the item is low, users very much seek to
avoid sharing the item [22], because it can cause them
a privacy breach; i.e., a sensitive item ends up shared
with someone they would not like —e.g., in the example
above, Bob would most probably not accept sharing
the photo in which he appears inebriated with Alice
and Charlie’s friends because he might feel embarrassed
about the photo and would prefer that no one sees it.
5.3 Computing Conflict Resolution
The mediator computes the solution for each conflict
found by applying the concession rules defined above.
The solution will be encoded into an action vector ~o, so
that o[t] contains the action for target user t. If t is not
conflicting, the mediator assigns to this target user the
action shared by all negotiation users. If t is conflicting,
the mediator assigns to o[t] its proposal to solve the
conflict. To this aim, the mediator executes Algorithm
2. In particular, for each conflicting target user t:
• If for all negotiating users, their willingness to ac-
cept changing their preferred action for the conflict-
ing target user is high, then, according to concession
rule IDM, the mediator assumes that all users are
willing to concede if need be, so that the final action
to be applied for target user t can be both grating
and denying. In order to select one of these two ac-
tions, the mediator runs a modified majority voting
rule (Lines 3-6). In particular, this function selects
the action that is most preferred by the majority of
users. In case that there is a tie — i.e., the number of
users who prefer granting and the number of users
who prefer denying is the same, then the one that
uploaded the item is given an extra vote. Note that
this function is only used if all the users have a high
willingness to accept the action that is not the most
preferred for them. That is, it does not really make
much of a difference for them which action is finally
taken, and all of them are willing to concede (change
their preferred action) to reach an agreement.
• If there are users whose willingness to accept chang-
ing their preferred action for the conflicting target
user is low (Lines 8-14), then the mediator considers
two cases: (i) if there are at least two users with low
willingness and different preferred actions, then, ac-
cording to concession rule IU, the action to be taken
should be denying the conflicting target user access
to the item in question; (ii) otherwise, rule IDM
applies so that the users that have high willingness
will concede and the user/users who has/have low
willingness will determine the action that is finally
chosen as the solution.
The complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|C|×|N |2). That is,
for each conflict, we need to know for each negotiating
agent what is her willingness, which can be calculated
in constant time as the sensitivity would only need
to be calculated once for all conflicts, and the relative
importance of each particular conflicting user can be
obtained in constant time. Note that in the very worst
case; i.e., the very unlikely case that all target agents turn
out to be in conflict, then C = T and the complexity of
Algorithm 2 would be O(|T | × |N |2).
Algorithm 2 Conflict Resolution
Input: N , Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , C
Output: ~o
1: for all c ∈ C do
2:
3: if ∀n ∈ N, W(n, c) is HIGH then
4: o[c]← modified majority(Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , c)
5: continue
6: end if
7:
8: if ∃a ∈ N, W(a, c) is LOW then
9: if ∃b ∈ N, W(b, c) is LOW ∧va[c] 6= vb[c] then
10: o[c]← 0
11: else
12: o[c]← va[c]
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
Eve Frank
Alice HIGH LOW
Bob LOW HIGH
TABLE 3
Fuzzy Memberships of willingness for Example 3.
Example 3: Suppose again Example 1 and consider
the willingness values calculated in Example 2. Table 3
shows the fuzzy set membership for negotiating users
Alice and Bob in case they would accept changing their
most preferred action for the conflicting target users C =
{Eve,Frank}. We can see that for Alice and Eve IDM rule
applies, so that the mediator assumes that Alice would
concede (in this case, to accept granting Eve access to
the item). As Bob has willingness LOW to change his
preferred action for Eve, then the action suggested by
this user would be taken to solve the conflict, and the
computed solution would be to grant Eve access to the
item. Regarding Frank, we have a similar situation. In
this case, the willingness is HIGH for Bob, so that IDM
rule applies and Bob would concede. As there is only
one negotiating user (Alice) with willingness LOW, then
the action suggested by this user is taken to solve the
conflict. Therefore, the solution to the conflict would be
to deny Frank access to the item. The resulting action
9vector for the item would be ~o = {1, 1, 1, 0}; i.e., Charlie,
Dan and Eve would be granted access to the item while
Frank would be denied access to the item.
6 USER STUDY
The aim of this section is to compare the performance of
our proposed mechanism to other existing approaches
in terms of what users would do themselves manually
in a number of situations. To this aim, we conducted the
user study described below.
6.1 Method
We sought to explore situations with different degrees
of sensitivity, as users’ behaviour to resolve conflicts
may be different depending on how sensitive items are.
However, this would have involved participants sharing
with us sensitive items of them. Participants sharing
sensitive information in user studies about privacy in
Social Media was already identified as problematic in
related literature [23], as participants would always seem
reluctant to share sensitive information, which biases the
study towards non-sensitive issues only. Indeed, this re-
luctance to share information that may be sensitive with
researchers during user surveys is not only associated
with studies about privacy and Social Media, but it has
also been extensively proven to happen in many other
survey situations, including other scientific disciplines
such as psychology [33]. A possible alternative to avoid
this problem could be one in which participants just self-
report how they behave when they experience a multi-
party privacy conflict without asking for any sensitive
information of them. However, the results obtained in
that case may not match participants’ actual behaviour
in practice, as previous research on privacy and Social
Media showed that there is a dichotomy between users’
stated privacy attitudes and their actual behaviour [34].
As a trade-off between these two alternatives, we chose
to recreate situations in which participants would be
immersed, following a similar approach to [35], maximis-
ing actual behaviour elicitation while avoiding biasing
the study to non-sensitive situations only. To this aim,
we described a situation to the participants and asked
them to immerse themselves in the situation by thinking
they were a particular person in a particular photo that
was to be shared through a Social Media site and that
they were tagged in it, and participants showed very
different individual privacy policies and concession deci-
sions depending on the situation as detailed below. Each
participant was presented with 10 different scenarios.
Scenarios were different across participants as they were
composed of: (i) one photo involving multiple users; and
(ii) a conflict created based on the individual privacy
policy the participant specified for the photo. As we
had 50 participants (as detailed below), we were able to
gather participant-specified data relative to 500 different
scenarios. Photos referred to different situations (e.g.,
travelling, playing with friends, partying, dating, etc.)
and were of different sensitivities a priori — though the
participants were asked to specify their privacy policy
for the photo as their first task for each scenario (as
detailed below), which was different according to how
sensitive each photo was for each participant.
We developed a web application that presented the
participants with the photos, stored the individual pri-
vacy policy they selected for each photo, generated
conflicts, and stored whether or not participants would
concede during a negotiation in the scenarios presented.
For each scenario, participants completed the following
two tasks using the application:
1) Definition of the Individual Privacy Policy. Each
participant was asked to define her/his most pre-
ferred privacy policy for each photo.
2) Conflict and Concession Question. Once the par-
ticipants defined their individual privacy policy for
the photo, a conflict was generated. That is, we
told the participants that one or more of the other
people in the photo had a different most preferred
action for one particular person, specifying the re-
lationship type and strength the participant would
have to this person. For instance, if the participant
only wanted to share the photo with close friends,
we told her/him that the other people in the photo
wanted to share the photo with someone that
was her/his acquaintance. Where multiple options
were available to generate a conflict, we chose one
of them randomly. Then, we asked participants
whether or not they would concede and change
their most preferred action for that person to solve
the conflict with the other people depicted in the
photo.
6.2 Participants
We recruited 50 participants via e-mail including univer-
sity students, academic and non-academic staff, as well
as other people not related to academia who volunteered
to participate in the study. Participants completed the
study online using the web application developed to that
end (as detailed above). Before starting, the application
showed the information to be gathered and participants
needed to consent to continue. Table 4 summarises par-
ticipants’ demographics (gender, age, job), Social Media
use (number of accounts in different Social Media sites,
and frequency of use), and if they were concerned about
their privacy in Social Media (Priv. concerned).
6.3 Results
The results gathered through the web application were
compared to the results that would have been obtained
if our proposed mechanism was applied to the scenar-
ios and if state-of-the-art automated voting mechanisms
were applied. To this aim, we looked at the privacy pol-
icy defined by the participant and the conflict generated
by the application for each situation. This determined
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Variable Distribution
Gender female (42%), male (58%)
Age 18-24 (18%), 25-30 (36%), 31-40 (24%),
41-50 (10%), 51-60 (6%), 60+(6%)
Job Agriculture(4%), Arts(2%), Computers(26%),
Design(6%),Education(16%),Engineering (10%),
Management(4%),Media(2%),
Research(14%),Sales(2%), Other(14%)
# accounts 0(4%),1(30%),2(18%),3(8%),4(12%),4+(28%)
Freq. of use monthly- (18%), monthly (10%),
weekly(10%), daily (26%), daily+(36%)
Priv. concerned not much(36%), yes(26%), very much(36%)
TABLE 4
Participants’ demographics, Social Media use, and
privacy concern.
participants’ most preferred action for the conflict (to
be considered by our proposed mechanism and state-of-
the-art voting mechanisms), as well as the willingness
to change it (used to determine the concession rule our
mechanism would apply in each case). In particular, we
compared the results that would have been obtained
applying our proposed mechanism to those that would
have been obtained applying the general voting mecha-
nisms used in state-of-the-art automated approaches:
• Uploader overwrites (UO), the conflict is solved se-
lecting the action preferred by the user that uploads
the item. This is the strategy currently followed by
most Social Media Sites (Facebook, etc.).
• Majority voting (MV) [12], the conflict is solved
selecting the action most preferred by the majority
of the negotiating users.
• Veto voting (VV) [2], if there is one negotiating user
whose most preferred action is denying access, the
conflict is solved by denying access to the item.
Figure 2 shows the results for each of the above voting
mechanisms as well as the results for our proposed
mechanism for automated conflict resolution (labelled
AR in the figure). In particular, it shows the percentage of
times each mechanism matched participants’ concession
behaviour in the scenarios above. We can observe that
our proposed mechanism AR clearly outperformed UO,
MV, and VV. This is because these mechanisms lack
enough flexibility to model actual user behaviour across
different situations in this domain, as they only consider
the most preferred action for each negotiating user as
a vote without considering the particular situation. We
can also observe that UO is very far from what users
did themselves, which is mainly due to UO not being
collaborative at all —i.e., the preferences of the other
parties are not considered. MV performs a bit better
than UO, but it is still far from what participants did
themselves. This is mostly due to the situations in which
even if the majority of users would like to share an
item in the first instance, they could reconsider this if
there is/are one/multiple user/(s) that would prefer not
sharing because this could have privacy consequences
for them.
We can also see in Figure 2 that VV performs better
than UO and MV. This result confirms that negotiating
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concession behaviour.
users are many times open to accept not sharing an item
if this can cause privacy breaches to one of them — as
also modelled in our proposed mechanism AR. How-
ever, VV is too restrictive to be suitable for all situations.
This is because there are also situations in which the
user/s whose most preferred action is denying access
may not mind granting access due to many reasons. In
these cases, VV would suggest solutions that mean los-
ing sharing opportunities. For instance, as stated earlier,
Alice and Bob could be depicted in a photo with very
low sensitivity — e.g., a photo in which both Alice and
Bob are depicted with a view to a monument — and both
of them could have defined privacy policies for the photo
so that all their friends can see it. Suppose that Charlie
is friend of Alice but is distant acquaintance of Bob,
so according to Alice’s privacy policy Charlie should
be granted access to the photo but according to Bob’s
privacy policy Charlie should not be granted access to
the item. However, given that the photo is not sensitive
for Bob, Bob would probably accept sharing also with
Charlie. VV would not consider this concession, and the
solution to solve the conflict would be not sharing with
Charlie, so it would be a lost sharing opportunity and
Alice may not even accept the solution. In contrast, our
mechanism is able to adapt to the particular situation,
being as restrictive as VV if needed but also considering
the cases in which concessions about granting access are
to happen —as the example above, in which the I do
not mind (IDM) rule would have picked that Bob would
concede, so that the final solution would be to share with
Charlie (recall the item was not sensitive to Bob).
We also sought to explore more closely how each
of the concession rules in our proposed mechanism
contributed to its performance as well as how state-of-
the-art voting mechanisms would work in each case.
Table 5 shows for each concession rule the number
of times that each rule would have been applied (#
Instantiations) in the 500 situations and Figure 3 shows
the performance of each approach broken down by the
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AR would apply (IDM - I do not mind, IU - I understand,
NC - No concession).
concession rule that would have been applied for each
situation. We can observe that performance was similar
across concession rules for our proposed mechanism AR;
i.e., once a particular concession rule instantiated for
a situation, it usually matched users’ behaviour with
respect to concessions. In particular, we observe that the
three concession rules in our mechanism obtain better
results than the state-of-art approaches. We can also
observe that the performance of state-of-the-art voting
mechanisms significantly varied according to the con-
cession rule AR would apply. This confirms the fact that
static ways of aggregating preferences (as those used in
state-of-the-art voting mechanisms) are not desirable in
this domain, because the concessions that may happen to
resolve multi-party privacy conflicts clearly depend on
the particular situation —as captured by the variables
considered by AR’s concession rules; i.e., individual
privacy preferences of each user, the sensitivity of the
item to be shared, and the relative importance of the
conflicting target user.
Concession Rule # Instantiations
I do not mind (IDM) 172
I understand (IU) 111
No concession (NC) 217
Total 500
TABLE 5
Number of times each AR concession rule would have
been applied.
Finally, we sought to find any correlation that could
exist between participants’ data —demographics, social
media use and privacy concern— and whether or not
participants behaved according to the concession rule
instantiated for each situation. To this aim, we calculated
the information gain (IG) — i.e., the reduction in entropy
— that each variable produced on whether the partici-
pant followed the corresponding rule or not once it was
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3
IG CC IG CC IG CC
Age 0 0.04 0 0 0 -0.10
Gender 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.13 0 -0.06
Job 0.08 -0.18 0.08 -0.17 0.04 0.11
Studies 0 0.18 0 0.16 0 0.017
Freq. of use 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.07
# Accounts 0 0.14 0 0.16 0 -0.05
Priv. Concern 0 0.13 0 0.16 0 0.04
TABLE 6
IGs and CCs for each rule based on participants’
demographics, social media use, and privacy concern.
All the correlation coefficients obtained were not
statistically significant (i.e., p > 0.05).
instantiated, and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
(CC). Table 6 summarises the values for each rule. IGs
and CCs were negligible and not statistically significant.
Thus, users’ characteristics like the privacy concern, age,
gender, profession, studies, and social media use did
not have any significant effect on whether participants
followed a concession rule once the rule was instantiated
for a particular situation. Note, however, the particular
concession rule instantiated in each situation depended
on the individual privacy policy of each user, the sensi-
tivity of the item for the user, and the relative importance
of the conflicting target user as stated above, which may
vary from participant to participant. The important thing
is that once a rule was instantiated, the variables above
did not influence whether the particular instantiated rule
was successful in matching user behaviour or not. In
other words, users’ characteristics (e.g., demographics,
privacy concern, etc.) may determine the individual
privacy policies users choose, which in turn determine
the rules that are instantiated for a given situation; but
users’ characteristics do not determine whether users’
concession behaviour matches that of the rule instan-
tiated. This suggests the mechanism proposed in this
paper captures general user behaviour and would be
able to adapt to both different situations and users.
7 RELATED WORK
Until now, very few contributions have considered the
problem of resolving conflicts in multi-party privacy
management for Social Media. Wishart et al. [10] pro-
posed a method to define privacy policies collabora-
tively. In their approach all of the parties involved can
define strong and weak privacy preferences. However,
this approach does not involve any automated method
to solve conflicts, only some suggestions that the users
might want to consider when they try to solve the
conflicts manually.
The work described in [11] is based on an incentive
mechanism where users are rewarded with a quantity
of numeraire each time they share information or ac-
knowledge the presence of other users (called co-owners)
who are affected by the same item. When there are
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conflicts among co-owners’ policies, users can spend
their numeraire bidding for the policy that is best for
them. Then, the use of the Clark Tax mechanism is
suggested to obtain the highest bid. As stated in [13],
users may have difficulties to comprehend the mech-
anism and specify appropriate bid values in auctions.
Furthermore, users that earned much numeraire in the
past — e.g., because they shared much information —
will have more numeraire to spend it at will, potentially
leading to unilateral decisions.
In [13] users must manually define for each item:
the privacy settings for the item, their trust to the
other users, the sensitivity of the item, and how much
privacy risk they would like to take. These parameters
are used to calculate what the authors call privacy risk
and sharing loss on segments — they define segments
as the set of conflicting target users among a set of
negotiating users. Then, based on these measures all of
the conflicting target users in each segment are assigned
the same action. That is, all of the conflicts that a set
of negotiating users have would be solved either by
granting or denying access. Clearly, not considering that
each individual conflict can have a different solution
leads to outcomes that are far from what the users would
be willing to accept. Moreover, due to how the privacy
risk and sharing loss metrics are defined, solutions are
likely to be the actions preferred by the majority of
negotiating users, which can be many times far from the
actual behaviour of users as shown in Section 6.
There are also related approaches based on voting
in the literature [2], [12]. In these cases, a third party
collects the decision to be taken (granting/denying) for
a particular friend from each party. Then, the authors
propose to aggregate a final decision based on one of
the voting rules already been described in Section 6 —
i.e., uploader overwrites (UO), majority voting (MV),
and veto voting (VV). These approaches are static, in
the sense that they always aggregate individual votes
in the same way by following the same voting rule.
Thus, these approaches are unable to adapt to different
situations that can motivate different concessions by
the negotiating users, which makes these approaches
unable to match the actual behaviour of users many
times, as shown in Section 6. Only in [14], the authors
consider that a different voting rule could be applied
depending on the situation. However, it is the user who
uploads/posts the item the one who chooses manually
which one of the voting rules (UO,MV,VV) to apply for
each item. The main problem with this — apart from
having to specify the voting rule manually for every item
— is that the choice of the voting rule to be applied
is unilateral. That is, the user that uploads the item
decides the rule to apply without considering the rest
of the negotiating users’ preferences, which becomes a
unilateral decision on a multi-party setting. Moreover, it
might actually be quite difficult for the user that uploads
the item to anticipate which voting rule would produce
the best result without knowing the preferences of the
other users.
Finally, the problem of negotiating a solution to multi-
party conflicts, has also been very recently analysed from
a game-theoretic point of view [36], [37]. These proposals
provide an elegant analytic framework proposing nego-
tiation protocols to study the problem and the kind of so-
lutions that can be obtained based on well-known game-
theoretic solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium.
However, as shown in [36], these proposals may not
always work well in practice, since they are not able to
capture the social idiosyncrasies considered by users in
the real life when they face multi-party privacy conflicts,
and users’ behaviour is far from perfectly rational as
assumed in these game-theoretic approaches — e.g., refer
to [3], [4].
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the first mechanism for detect-
ing and resolving privacy conflicts in Social Media that
is based on current empirical evidence about privacy ne-
gotiations and disclosure driving factors in Social Media
and is able to adapt the conflict resolution strategy based
on the particular situation. In a nutshell, the mediator
firstly inspects the individual privacy policies of all users
involved looking for possible conflicts. If conflicts are
found, the mediator proposes a solution for each conflict
according to a set of concession rules that model how
users would actually negotiate in this domain.
We conducted a user study comparing our mechanism
to what users would do themselves in a number of situ-
ations. The results obtained suggest that our mechanism
was able to match participants’ concession behaviour
significantly more often than other existing approaches.
This has the potential to reduce the amount of man-
ual user interventions to achieve a satisfactory solution
for all parties involved in multi-party privacy conflicts.
Moreover, the study also showed the benefits that an
adaptive mechanism like the one we presented in this
paper can provide with respect to more static ways of
aggregating users’ individual privacy preferences, which
are unable to adapt to different situations and were far
from what the users did themselves.
The research presented in this paper is a stepping
stone towards more automated resolution of conflicts in
multi-party privacy management for Social Media. As
future work, we plan to continue researching on what
makes users concede or not when solving conflicts in this
domain. In particular, we are also interested in exploring
if there are other factors that could also play a role in
this, like for instance if concessions may be influenced by
previous negotiations with the same negotiating users.
Finally, in this paper we focused on centralised Social
Media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and the like,
because this type of Social Media is the most widespread.
However, another possible future line of research could
be that of investigating distributed negotiation protocols
without a centralised mediator. This could be of partic-
ular interest for the emerging decentralised Social Media
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infrastructures such as Friendica [38] and Diaspora [39],
in which the information about the privacy policies and
relationships among users would be distributed among
the different instances that make up the social network.
Even for such distributed negotiation protocols, most of
the concepts and formalisms we have presented in this
paper would still be useful. For instance, the willingness
measures and the concession rules could be used locally
by each social media instance during the execution of
the distributed negotiation protocol to decide whether
the negotiating users hosted in that particular instance
of the social network would be willing to concede or not.
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APPENDIX A
APPLYING THE MECHANISM TO REBAC
To showcase that our proposed mechanism can also be
used in conjunction with other access control models,
we include in this appendix the formalisation needed
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to use relationship-based access control (ReBAC) [15],
[16], [17] in conjunction with our mechanism. ReBAC
defines individual privacy preferences differently from
the group-based privacy policies considered in Def. 1,
so it needs adapted definitions of the action function
(Def. 2), item sensitivity (Def. 6), and relative importance
(Def. 7), which are the functions that depend on how
individual privacy preferences are expressed. Note that
a preliminary formalisation of a ReBAC approach to
solve multi-party conflicts appeared in [40], but the
following is new in accordance to the conflict resolution
mechanism presented in this paper.
ReBAC privacy policies usually consider different re-
lationship types R = {r1, . . . , rl} — e.g., family, friends,
colleagues, etc.; and define a mapping r : U ×U → R so
that r(a, b) is the relationship type between users a and
b. Privacy policies in most ReBAC approaches [15] also
consider the strength of the relationships that a user has
to other users. A ReBAC privacy policy can be defined
as follows:
Definition 8: A relationship-based privacy policy P is
a tuple so that P = 〈θ1, . . . , θ|R|, E〉, where θj ∈ {0, . . . , δ}
is the relationship strength threshold for the relationship
type rj ∈ R, and E ⊆ U is the set of exceptions to the
policy.
The action function (Def. 2) would be then defined as:
Definition 9: Given a user n ∈ N , her relationship-
based privacy policy Pn = 〈θ1, . . . , θ|R|, E〉, and a user
t ∈ T ; we define the action function as:
act(Pn, t) =

1 if τ(n, t) ≥ θr(n,t) ∧ t /∈ E
1 if τ(n, t) < θr(n,t) ∧ t ∈ E
0 otherwise
Item sensitivity (Def. 6) for the case of relationship-
based privacy policies would be defined as follows:
Definition 10: Given a user n ∈ N , relationship types
R, and n’s ReBAC privacy policy Pn for an item; the
sensitivity of the item for n is defined as follows:
Sn = 1| R |
∑
r∈R
Pn.θr
Finally, the last definition that would need to be
adapted depending on the access control model is the
relative importance of the conflicting target user (Def.
7), which can be defined for ReBAC as follows:
Definition 11: Given a user n ∈ N , relationship types
R, n’s ReBAC privacy policy Pn for an item, and a
conflicting target user c ∈ C; the relative importance of
c for n, denoted as In(c), is defined as:
In(c) =| Pn.θr(n,c) − τ(n, c) |
